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 In 1820 the Plattsburgh was condemned for violating federal anti-slave trade legislation.  
This little known, rarely cited Supreme Court decision is important, because it pierces the veneer 
of romanticism that has been allowed to sugar over our recollection of Baltimore's maritime 
history.  The case indicates that some of the most prominent ship owners and captains at the time, 
including Thomas Sheppard, John N. D'Arcy, Henry Didier, and Thomas Boyle, have links to the 
slave trade.  This paper explores the cruel realities of the international slave trade, the ineffective 
federal laws aimed at prohibiting it, and the efforts by merchants to circumvent federal law in 
order to make money on the suffering of the innocent. 
 




 Lieutenant Silas Horton Stringham steadied  himself, as his boat was rocked by the 
waves.  Wiping the sweat from his brow, Stringham stared across the water at his adversary.  She 
was a schooner, a wooden sailing ship with two masts raked back towards her square stern and 
sails that were rigged fore and aft.  Although she was a modest vessel, a little over one hundred 
feet long overall with only one deck and no figure head, she was undoubtedly fast.1  A cargo 
vessel that traded bulk space for speed.2  Not only was she fast, but the eighteen and twelve 
pound guns on her deck showed that she had teeth.3  There could be only one reason why this 
fast and armed vessel was off the coast of Africa.  She was in the slave trade.4  The exact trade 
that Stringham was charged to stop.   
 Stringham was a naval officer serving on board the USS Cyane under the command of 
Captain Edward Trenchard.  Formerly of Her Majesty's Navy, the Cyane was captured by the 
USS Constitution during the War of 1812, and she was pressed into American service in 1815.5  
By 1820, the Cyane was patrolling the coast of Africa in order to prevent violations of American 
anti-slave trade legislation.6 
 The Cyane was also assisting the efforts of groups of recently freed African American 
slaves.  These freedman were attempting to create a colony on the western coast of Africa which 
would eventually become the nation of Liberia.7  The Cyane had previously interdicted six 
vessels, but had only found probable cause to hold two of them, the Esperenza and the Endmion.  
Although the United States had banned the international slave trade, this prohibition was not 
universally recognized.  Both of these vessels that the Cyane held were American schooners 
purporting, through various forms of subterfuge, to be Spanish ships legally engaged in the slave 
trade.8   
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The Pride of Baltimore II a vessel of similar characteristics to the Plattsburgh9 
 
 Thus when this new schooner crossed the Cyane's path Captain Trenchard had reason to 
believe that this was yet another American schooner fraudulently claiming another flag of 
convenience.  Trenchard sent Stringham in a boat to interdict the schooner and bring it back to 
the Cyane for inspection.  As Stringham approached his quarry the schooner fired a twelve pound 
gun, in order to discourage his efforts.  In response Stringham bellowed, “If you fire that gun 
again I'll come on board and put every man to death.”  His quarry sufficiently cowed, Stringham 
and his party came on board and directed the schooner to sail to the Cyane.10 
Introduction 
 The vessel's true name was the Plattsburgh,* but she was registered under the pseudonym 
Maria Gertrudes at the time.11  Like the previous ships the Cyane had interdicted, the vessel was 
an American ship, but her operators were fraudulently claiming she was a Spanish one.  Just as 
with the other vessels, she was designed to run blockades and capture merchant ships as prizes.  
However, she was equally at home in the lucrative task of human trafficking.12  The Plattsburgh 
                                                 
*  As will be discussed more fully later, the types of case that are discussed in this article often 
have an identical caption to the vessels at risk in the litigation.  For the sake of clarity this article 
follows the convention of italicizing “the” in case names but not in vessel names.  In other words 
the vessel that is named the Plattsburgh is at risk in the case captioned The Plattsburgh. 
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was eventually sailed to the port of New York and condemned in an unreported case in U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.13  Although the case would eventually 
make its way to the Supreme Court of the United States, the short opinion is rarely cited.14 
 However, this little known and rarely cited case is still important, because it provides 
insight into the darker side of the Baltimore's past.  Piercing through the well polished veneer of 
respectability of Baltimore merchants, one steps into a world of greed, corruption, and evil.  A 
world in which the wealth and success of the rich few is bought and paid by suffering and 
degradation of the innocent.  A world in which government officials are more than happy to turn 
a blind eye to businessman who flagrantly violate federal laws.  A world in which money is the 
ultimate goal and kidnapping, torture, and murder were simply the cost of doing business. 
 At the time the Plattsburgh set sail, it was well established that the international slave 
trade was a violation of federal law.15  Nevertheless this evil, yet highly lucrative, practice 
continued, and indeed it was common place.16  The events surrounding the case of The 
Plattsburgh,17 were the result of a conspiracy, hatched by a merchant named Thomas Sheppard, 
to engage in the international slave trade in violation of federal law. 
 The plan was simple.  Although it was illegal for American ships to traffic slaves from 
Africa to the New World, it was still legal for Spanish ships to traffic slaves from Africa to the 
New World.  In order to circumvent federal law, the American conspirators partnered with a 
Spanish subject.  The Spanish subject would buy the American built and American crewed ship, 
which would traffic slaves from Africa to Spanish coloies in the New World.   
In this particular case the Plattsburgh legally sailed to Cuba, where she was sold to a 
Spanish subject Juan Marino.  She was subsequently interdicted off the coast of Africa by an 
American naval vessel.  The key issue in this case was whether the Plattsburgh was still an 
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American ship even though she had Spanish papers.  The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that 
the ship was American, and thus the Plattsburgh was subject to forfeiture under American law.18 
It is difficult to determine who Sheppard's co-conspirators are.  However, some likely 
suspects include John N. D'Arcy, Henry Didier, and Thomas Boyle.  These individuals were 
fellow ship merchants and ship captains who have ties to Sheppard and the Plattsburgh.  
Examining the events surrounding this particular case provides a deeper understanding of a 
historical period that naturally lends itself to being sugared over with romantic notions of a 
swashbuckling lifestyle.  However, a closer inspection reveals that the men in the privateering 
industry were first and foremost concerned with profits.  They were just as happy making money 
trafficking slaves as they were making money running English blockades. 
Laws Prohibiting the International Slave Trade. 
 When the Constitution was adopted, slavery was common.  Approximately one fifth of 
the population of the United States were slaves.  However, the vast majority of slaves resided in 
the southern states.19  Although several state constitutions, such as Massachusetts and Vermont, 
banned slavery,20 other states, such as Pennsylvania, where adopting a more gradual approach to 
emancipation.  Individuals who were already enslaved remained so, but there would be no new 
slaves.21  Interestingly enough although the several states could not agree on whether or not 
slavery should be abolished, there was a wide spread consensus that the international slave trade 
should be abolished.  Prior to the writing of the Constitution 10 out of 13 states banned importing 
slaves from other countries.22 
 Although the Constitution did not make slavery illegal, it did permit the federal 
government to regulate it.23  Consequently, after the ratification of the Constitution the new 
federal government legislated a series of acts designed to abolish the international slave trade.  
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The first such act was the Slave Trade Act of 1794, declaring that “no citizen … or any other 
person whatsoever, either as master, factor or owner, [may] build, fit, equip, load or otherwise 
prepare any ship … within … [the] United States … for the purpose of … trad[ing] … in 
slaves[.]”24  Violations of this statue would lead to the vessel being condemned.25  In 1800 
Congress passed additional legislation specifically prohibiting the residents of the United States 
from voluntarily serving on board slave ships and subjected violators to a $2,000.00 fine as a 
penalty;26 over $26,000.00 in today's currency.27   
 In 1803, Congress created fines for bringing any “negro, mulatto, or other person of 
color” from Africa or the Caribbean into states that had banned the importation of slaves.28  This 
clarification was designed to prevent individuals from claiming that they were engaged in the 
international indentured servant trade as a way to get around the anti-slave trade legislation.29  In 
1807, Congress finally passed legislation that completely banned importing slaves.30   
However, the law did not go into effect until 1808, because the Constitution prohibited 
the federal government from regulating the “migration or importation of such persons as any the 
States shall think proper to admit” until 1808.31  The statutes passed in 1794 and 1803 were able 
to go into effect immediately, because instead of directly regulating the migration or importation 
of people the 1794 and 1803 statutes regulated what ships could be built and who could work on 
them. 
 Finally it should be noted that although the international slave trade was banned, there 
were no laws prohibiting the domestic slave trade.  This included the coastal slave trade.  It was 
perfectly legal and quite common for ships to transport slaves from Baltimore to southern ports; 
such as New Orleans.32 
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Enforcing the Law 
 If an American ship was caught preparing for or engaging in the slave trade, the vessel 
was subject to forfeiture.33  Forfeiture proceedings were originally developed to deal with prize 
cases; cases where privateers claimed the right to sell enemy ships that they had captured.  
Although typically rebuked as state sponsored piracy, prize cases were actually quite 
sophisticated.  Article 1 of the Constitution permits Congress to grant letters of marque to 
American privateers.34  Only properly licensed privateers, with letters of marque, could recover 
in a prize case.  Letters of marque would only be issued during armed conflicts for the duration 
of the conflict.35   
 Privateers could only seize enemy ships.  Privateers were forbidden from using excessive 
force to capture the ship, and privateers were also forbidden from pilfering the cargo; also known 
as breaking bulk.36  A violation of these prohibitions could result in the loss of a privateer’s 
rights to the prize.  Once privateers seized a vessel they had to sail the ship to an American port 
and condemn the ship in a U.S. District Court where the privateers would have to prove that they 
had legally captured an enemy ship and hadn't pilfered the cargo.37  The cases would be litigated 
under in rem jurisdiction; jurisdiction of the thing rather than jurisdiction of a person.38  
Consequently the cases would often be captioned by the name of there ship; i.e. The 
Plattsbugh.39 
 The procedures for condemning slave ships where similar to the procedures for 
condemning prize ships.  The Naval or Revenue Marine crews who captured the ship would have 
to prove in U.S. District court the vessel was American and that it was either engaging in the 
international slave trade or making preparations to engage in the international slave trade.  If the 
crew prevailed then they would have to have a right to a share of the profits.40   
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 Of course privateers would by necessity have set sail to catch their quarry to bring them 
back to the United States.  Astonishingly the violations of the Slave Trade Acts were so flagrant 
that occasionally government officials would not even have to leave the pier in order to interdict 
American slave ships.  Some vessels, such as the Caroline, and the Emily,41 were actually 
condemned before they even left American harbors. 
 One particularly delicate question that had to be answered about the proceedings was, 
“What should happen to the Africans who had been on board the interdicted slave ship?”  
Slavery itself was still legal in many states.42  In addition to the ship, the ship’s “tackle, furniture, 
apparel, and other appurtenances”43 were also subject to forfeiture.  Consequently, a morally 
troubling, yet plausible, legal argument could be made that the human cargo should also be sold 
for the profit of the United States and the crew that interdicted the slave ship.44   
By 1819 however, the legal issue became moot, because Congress passed legislation 
ordering that Africans, who were on board interdicted slave ships, be repatriated back to Africa.45  
In spite of this, Africans often faced long waits before being repatriated.  On at least one 
occasion Africans were forced to work as slaves while waiting to be repatriated back to Africa.46 
 In support of repatriation efforts, American warships patrolled the African coast to insure 
that repatriated Africans were not recaptured.  This American presence eventually came to be 
known as the African Squadron.  Compared to the much larger and experienced British naval 
presence, African Squadron was largely insignificant.  Nevertheless, African Squadron 




The Cruel Realities of the Slave Trade 
 
Cross Section of a Baltimore Clipper Slave Ship48 
 
The Baltimore clipper is a smart vessel that is often thought of as a symbol of ingenuity 
and the fighting spirit of the early American experience.49  However, a more complete look at the 
history of this vessel reveals that it was also employed for more darker and nefarious purposes.  
The Baltimore clipper and her predecessors were small fast schooners that were used to transport 
cargo.  At a time when colonial cities were small and did not have a large demand for bulk 
goods, a cargo ship that could transport a small amount of cargo to these remote locations 
quickly found a vital niche.50  During the War of 1812 these ships became the choice vessels of 
blockade runners and privateers.51   
Eventually all wars must come to an end, but the perpetual need to make profits endures 
far longer than any war.  Ship owners and captains found new ways to exploit the use of this 
nimble craft.  One particular method was to simply privateer for another nation against a 
sovereign that the United States was not at war with.  It should be noted that this was a strict 
violation of the Neutrality Acts.  Even so, ship owners and captains developed black market 
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networks for supplying this mercenary service to nations that were willing to pay for it.52 
A second source of revenue was for American vessels to engage in the international slave 
trade.  Using the same or similar black market networks, ship owners and captains negotiated 
with foreign merchants to transfer color of title in order to allow American crews on American 
ships to purport to be Spanish crews on Spanish ships.  While the international slave trade was 
illegal in the United States and Great Britain, it was legal for ships registered in Spain at the 
time.  These same traits of speed and maneuverability that made Baltimore clippers such good 
blockade runners (i.e. the ability to get in and out of an area quickly and undetected) also lent 
themselves to the terrible evil of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.53 
Although illegal in the United States, the cruel practice of the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
continued to thrive.  The reason this black market persisted, despite the extensive federal 
legislation that was levied against it, was that the institution was unbelievably lucrative.  For 
example, a Baltimore clipper that was approximately 90 feet long and 27 feet abeam could 
transport on average 507 African slaves at an approximate total profit of $67,000.00 per voyage 
in 1820s currency.54  That is over 1 million dollars in 2012 currency.55  The Plattsburgh was over 
one hundred feet long.56  Consequently her owners could have expected to make similar, if not 
larger, profits from the voyage. 
The pure avarice that would have been spawned by the potentially mountains of money 
that could be obtained from the international slave trade, might very well have been exacerbated 
by a financial crisis of 1819.  The Panic of 1819 was the nation’s first major depression.  Caused, 
in part, by the fraudulent practices of the Second Bank of the United States, the depression was a 
serious threat to the wealthy merchant elite of Baltimore.  Many wealthy merchants were nearly 
wiped out; being forced to sell their homes and liquidate their merchant houses.  The need for 
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ship owners to find another way to make a living after the War of 1812 was over, and the 
pressure of the Panic of 1819, were a perfect mixture of greed and fear that motivated the 
merchants of Baltimore to engage in this highly lucrative clandestine activity.57 
However, this vast amount of wealth was built on a mountain of human suffering.  
Setting aside for the moment the evils of slavery itself, particular attention needs to be paid to the 
crime of trafficking people from Africa to the New World.  To say that the conditions on board 
these ships were horrific is a gross understatement.  It would be fair to describe the passage to 
the New World in the bowels of a Baltimore clipper as Hell on Earth.  As one missionary who 
witnessed the sight reported “human beings … wedged together … in low cells three feet high … 
[t]he heat of these horrid places was so great, and the [odor] so offensive, that it was quite 
impossible to enter them.”58 
Under these conditions it was quite common for many Africans to die during the passage.  
However, not only were slave ship owners and captains aware of the problem, they built this 
intolerable cruelty into their business model in order to ensure that the voyage would be 
profitable.  Understanding that as more and more people were crammed into the hull the 
likelihood that individuals would die increased, Captains developed a probabilistic methodology 
whereby they would try to squeeze just enough people into the holds to maximize the total 
amount of Africans who would survive the journey.59 
It was under these conditions that Thomas Sheppard participated in a conspiracy to 
violate federal law by trafficking slaves from Africa to the New World; presumably the 
plantations of Cuba.  It is not entirely clear who his co-conspirators where or how they had 
intended to share the profits.  What is clear is that Sheppard hired Captain Joseph Smith and 
George Stark to complete the task using Spanish papers as a shield from liability. 
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The Plattsburgh, Case Brief 
 In 1817 Thomas Sheppard, John N. D'Arcy, Henry Didier bought the Plattsbugh.60  
Sheppard was a flour merchant and ship owner.61  D'Arcy and Didier were partners in a shipping 
firm.62  William Patton was the master of the vessel at the time of the sale.63  However, by 1819 
the Plattsburgh was under the command of Captain Joseph F. Smith.64   
 It was a matter of some contention who owned the Plattsburgh by 1819.  Although the 
Plattsburgh was still registered to Sheppard, D'Arcy, and Didier, Sheppard contends that D'Arcy 
and Didier sold their portion to Sheppard.  Sheppard further contends that he authorized a man 
named George Stark to sail the Plattsburgh to Cuba for the sole purpose of selling it.65  However, 
testimony from the crew members seems to indicate that Stark was merely the supercargo; the 
individual responsible for all the cargo on a ship.66 
 Stark was not on board the Plattsburgh when she left Baltimore, because Stark was on 
another ship known as the Eros.67  The Eros was a brig; a two-masted square rigger.  It was 
owned by Thomas Boyle; a famous shipowner and captain.68  The Eros rendezvoused with the 
Plattsburgh in the Chesapeake Bay.  Stark came on board with a few barrels of cargo.  Crew 
members report that irons and manacles were hidden inside the barrels that Stark brought on 
board from the Eros.  The Plattsburgh and the Eros subsequently sailed to Cuba.69   
 In Cuba, Stark arranged for the transfer of the Plattsburgh's title to Juan Marino, a 
Spanish subject.  The Plattsburgh's name was changed to Maria Gertrudes, and a new master 
was given command of the ship.70  However, the original master Smith, remained on board and 
continued to issue orders to the officers and crew in writing.  On example of the orders that 
Smith wrote to the first mate while he was allegedly a passenger was as follows. 
“Sir, I wish you to get the schooner down to Morro in the morning, and get the 
men quartered to the guns, and station them on the tops and forecastle, the same 
13 
as on board armed ships, and get all ready for going to sea To Morow night.  After 
you get down to Morro, send the boat with four men, for me.  Yours Jos. 
Smith.[sic]”71 
 
 Additionally the log book was kept in English.  Most of the crew were American and 
spoke English.72  Although a few Spanish crew members were still on board they worked 
through an interpreter who spoke English, and receive commands from the American crew.  The 
crew was discharged when the vessel was sold, and then subsequently rehired by the new 
“owner.”  However, the crew had been informed before this transaction that the Plattsburgh 
would be sailing to Africa.73 
 After she was outfitted the Plattsburgh, operating under the alias Maria Gertrudes, set 
sail for the coast of Africa.  After she arrived, a party was sent ashore the first day.  However, the 
next day the Plattsburgh was interdicted by a boarding party from the Cyane under the command 
of LT Stringham.74  No slaves were found on board.  Nevertherless, the Cyane's commanding 
officer determined that there was probable cause to hold the Plattsburgh as an American ship 
illegally engaging in the international slave trade.  This was undoubtedly based in part on the fact 
that the Plattsburgh was a Baltimore clipper75 and thus was “similar in respect to size, fitments, 
and general appearance” to “all the vessels hovering on [the African] coast” for the purpose of 
trafficking slaves.76  The presence of the predominantly American crew and the ship’s log (kept 
in English) would also have been further proof that the ship was American. 
 The Plattsburgh was eventually sailed back to New York City, where she was condemned 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for violating the Slave 
Trade Acts of 1794 and 1800.  In an unreported decision Judge William P. Van Ness held that the 
Plattsburgh should be condemned under the Slave Trade Acts, because her voyage had 
originated in the United States.  Therefore, she was American property at the time of seizure.  
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Judge Van Ness further opined that “the prohibition [of the international slave trade] … is nearly 
universal; and it is pressed upon their serious deliberation whether this traffic may not now be 
pronounced, as well contrary to the law of nations as of nature.”77  Marino, the Plattsburgh's 
Spanish “owner” appealed. 
 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision pro forma, and the Supreme Court 
heard the case.78  In their argument that the Plattsburgh was a duly registered Spanish ship 
legally engaged in the international slave trade, Marino's attorneys cited to The Diana,79 and The 
Louis.80  In The Diana,81 Sir William Scott opined that national governments “did not mean to 
set themselves up as legislators for the whole world, or presume in any manner to interfere with 
the commercial regulations of other states.”82  In The Louis,83 Scott further opined that slavery 
could not be considered a violation of the law of nations, because “standard[s] must be found in 
the law of nations, as fixed and evidenced by general and ancient, and admitted practice, by 
treaties, and by the general tenor of the laws and ordinances.”84   
 In the government's argument the Plattsburgh was actually an American vessel, the 
government cited to The Fortuna,85 and The Donna Marianna.86  In The Fortuna,87 a British 
court condemned an American vessel engaged in the international slave trade on the grounds that 
the vessel could only prevail if the United States guaranteed a right for the vessel to be engaged 
in the international slave trade; which it didn't.  In The Donna Marianna,88 a British court 
condemned a British vessel that had been sold to Portuguese interests to be used in the slave 
trade when the vessels registration papers contradicted each other “leaving the whole transaction 
of the transfer in great doubt and obscurity.”89  Sir Scott opined “I can have no doubt that this 
Court is bound to judicially consider this a British vessel.”90     
 However, the government also looked to American cases in its arguments.  The 
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government relied on The St. Jago de Cuba,91  in its arguments.  In The St. Jago de Cuba,92 the 
owner of an American vessel contracted an agent to sail a vessel to Cuba and sell it.  After the 
vessel was sold the buyer used the vessel to engage in the international slave trade.  Although the 
vessel was under color of Spanish title, the Supreme Court held that the vessel was actually 
American and the ship was condemned. 
 The Supreme Court declined to extend Judge Van Ness's dicta that the international slave 
trade violated international law.93  In fact the Supreme Court repudiated Judge Van Ness's claim 
in another case The Antelope,94 that was released the same day as The Plattsburgh.95  In The 
Antelope,96 the Court held that the “African slave trade is contrary to the law of nature, but is not 
prohibited by the positive law of nations.”97 
 Although the Supreme Court declined to affirm Judge Van Ness's dicta that the 
international slave trade was now a violation of international law, the Court affirmed the District 
Courts' determination that the Plattsburgh should be condemned.98  The Court held that the 
essential issue to the case was whether the Plattsburgh was still subject to forfeiture under 
American law.  The Court held that the Plattsburgh was indeed an American ship for two 
reasons.  First, although most of the outfitting of the ship took place in Cuba, the ship was 
outfitted for the slave trade while still in American waters.  Second, the Court held that the 
presence of Stark onboard as well as the predominantly American crew was sufficient to declare 
the Plattsburgh an American ship subject to American law. 
The Plattsburgh was outfitted for the slave trade when manacles were brought onboard 
while the ship was still the Chesapeake bay.  Citing to The Emily and The Caroline,99 a case 
involving American ships outfitted for slavery at the pier but condemned before they could leave 
port, the Court held that any preparations no matter how small constitute a violation of the Slave 
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Trade Act of 1794.  Consequently, when Stark brought the manacles on board smuggled in a 
barrel this alone would have been sufficient to condemn the vessel.100 
 Even so, the Plattsburgh was still subject to forfeiture, because of the presence of the 
American master and the predominantly American crew.  The Court also relied heavily on the 
letter from Smith to the crew to determine that Smith was actually still in command of the 
Plattsburgh.  Writing for the Court, Justice Joseph Story opined, “But what is decisive, to show 
that this is a mere disguise … is the letter found on board … in which the mask is stripped 
off[.] … Nothing can be more unlike the character … of a passenger than these directions.”101   
If Smith was still the master this indicates that this was still and American vessel.  The 
Court went on to say that if Marino was a bona fide purchaser he would have done well to 
remove any indication that this was still an American vessel by removing Smith and the other 
American personnel from it.102  Consequently, the Court found that the transfer of the manacles, 
while still in American waters, and Smith’s communication to the predominantly American crew 
was sufficient to condemn the Plattsburgh. 
The Plattsburgh Unveiled. 
 When Thomas Sheppard sent the Plattsburgh to Cuba, he undoubtedly intended that it 
should be used in the slave trade, and that he would receive a share of profits from the voyage.  
The Plattsburgh was involved in the international slave trade from the beginning.  Sheppard was 
involved in subterfuge that was intricately linked to the events of the Plattsburgh.  The only 
reason that Sheppard would try to cover his tracks is if he had something to hide, and since it was 
involved with a ship that was engaged in the slave trade it stands to reason the Sheppard was 
involved.   
 One can safely assume that the Plattsburgh was involved in the international slave trade 
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from the beginning of its voyage for the same reasons stated by the supreme court.  Specifically 
that Smith remained on board as an incognito master of the vessel after the vessel was sold to 
Marino.  Furthermore the testimony of the crew that irons and manacles were smuggled on board 
while the ship was still in American waters also indicates that the Platsburgh was involved in the 
international slave trade even before it was sold to Marino.103    
 It is highly unlikely that Sheppard and Stark were truly selling the Plattsburgh to Marino.  
Granted, it is not impossible that Sheppard falling on hard times would wish to sell a ship.  It's 
also not impossible that Sheppard would believe that he could fetch a good price for the ship in 
Cuba.  However, the inordinate amount of subterfuge associated with the sale makes this 
unlikely.  After Sheppard bought D'Arcy's and Didier's share of the Plattsburgh he failed to alter 
the vessel's registry, in violation of federal law.104  Sheppard claimed that this was because he 
happened to be insolvent at the time.  Now it is true that Sheppard probably was in dire financial 
straights at the time.  This was in the middle of the Panic of 1819, when many merchants and 
ship owners were fighting to stay afloat.105   
 However, it seems unlikely that D'Arcy and Didier, who themselves were nearly 
insolvent at the time, would agree to allow Sheppard to buy their portion of the Plattsburgh 
(worth $6,000.00 in 1819 over $88,000.00 in today's currency106) on credit.  After all, D’arc and 
Didier were also desperate for liquidity.  This seems even more incredible when they, as 
sophisticated and experienced shipowners, would have known that Sheppard's failure to register 
the vessel could lead to subsequent legal complications.  Legal complication would make it even 
less likely that they would get repaid.  This suggests that we cannot take Sheppard's story at face 
value, and Sheppard must be hiding something.   
 If Sheppard is hiding something, then the fact that this was a slave trade operation from 
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the beginning suggests that Shepard knew about it from the beginning.  Furthermore the fact that 
Sheppard needed money, and the slave trade was highly lucrative is further evidence that 
Sheppard was involved in an international slave trade operation from the beginning.  
Consequently, we can conclude that Sheppard was part of a conspiracy with Smith and Stark to  
engage in the international slave trade in violation of federal law. 
So Just Who Was In On the Conspiracy? 
 Naturally we can assume that at the very least Sheppard, Smith, and Stark were involved 
in the conspiracy to engage in the international slave trade.  Sheppard provided the ship.  Stark 
provided the documents, and Smith commanded the ship.  But does the conspiracy end there.  
Now in these sorts of speculations there is always the propensity to spiral off into wild flights of 
fancy.  Naturally this is something to be avoided.  Nevertheless based on the facts before us, 
there are numerous links to other ship owners and privateers who have a history of traveling in 
circles of people who flagrantly violate federal law.  Based on these facts it is reasonable to 
suspect John N. D'Arcy, Henry Didier, and Thomas Boyle. 
 The first likely suspects are D'Arcy and Didier.  D'Arcy and Didier were partners in a 
shipping firm together.  They owned numerous privateers during the War of 1812, and made a 
great deal of money.107  Nevertheless D'Arcy and Didier were hit hard by the Panic of 1819, and 
needed liquidity.  As stated earlier, it seems unlikely that D’Arcy and Didier would have 
voluntarily sold their share of the Plattsburgh on credit when they were so strapped for liquidity.  
This seems even more incredible, because if the ship was forfeited, D’Arcy and Didier would 
sustain a total loss on their investment.  Furthermore D'Arcy and Didier were quite comfortable 
violating federal neutrality laws in order to finance privateers who were attacking the ships of 
nations that the United States was not at war with.108   
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It should be noted that just because D'Arcy and Didier were breaking other federal 
legislation doesn't necessarily mean that they were breaking the anti-slave trade legislation.  
However, it does indicate that they would have had access to and would be quite comfortable 
exploiting the same kinds of black market networks that would be used to violate the anti-slave 
trade legislation.109  Given that they had a history of circulating in black market networks, were 
in desperate in need of funds, and had close links to Sheppard and the case, D'Arcy and Didier 
had means, motive, and opportunity to participate in this conspiracy.  It is therefore reasonable to 
suspect that D'Arcy and Didier were also involved in the scheme.  To what extent is uncertain at 
this point. 
 Thomas Boyle is another likely suspect.  Boyle was captain and shipowner whose claim 
to fame includes personally proclaiming the British Isles under blockade during the War of 1812.   
In support of this effort Boyle had exactly one ship.110  Boyle's only connection with this case is 
that Boyle owned the Eros.111  The act of loading the manacles, hidden inside a barrel, onto the 
Eros and later transferring them to the Plattsburgh was a key component of the conspiracy 
between Sheppard, Stark, and Smith.  The only question is to what degree did Boyle know about 
it.  It's entirely possible that Stark simply found a ship with similar travel plans to the 
Plattsburgh. Stark then would have simply contracted them to rendezvous with the Plattsburgh 
in order to transfer Stark and the barrels.  The crew might not have known that the barrels 
contained irons and manacles inside.  The Eros may simply have been the ship that had similar 
travel plans.   
 However, even under this scenario, one can simply make the argument that the crew of 
the Eros was remaining willfully ignorant of Stark's plans.  After all, the Plattsburgh was in the 
same harbor as the Eros and left at approximately the same time.112  The question must have 
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occurred to the master or supercargo of the Eros, “Why don't you just take yourself and your 
barrel onto the Plattsburgh while it's still moored in the harbor, rather than trying to rendezvous 
with her in the middle of the Chesapeake Bay at night?”  The obvious answer, which would have 
been clear to an experienced crew, is that Stark was hiding something, and he didn't want to risk 
getting caught in Baltimore harbor by the light of day. 
Considering Boyle’s record as a highly capable commander, it seems unlikely that Boyle 
would only have a mere cursory knowledge of what was going onboard his ship.113  
Nevertheless, even operating under this assumption, it is still reasonable to assume that at the 
very least Boyle would have known that the Eros was making suspicious rendezvous in the 
middle of the night.  Therefore Boyle at the very least was remaining willfully ignorant of this 
kind of suspicious activity.  Although this is not technically a conspiracy, in that it does not 
involve a solicitation from a party to commit a criminal act and an agreement to commit a 
criminal act by another,114 it is still a reasonable conclusion that Boyle was tacitly consenting to 
this kind of activity to occur on his ship.   
 Furthermore, it is still entirely possible that Boyle was even more intricately involved in 
Sheppard, Stark, and Smith's plot.  Boyle traveled in the same circles as Sheppard, D'Arcy, and 
Didier.  Boyle was living through the same financial crisis in 1819.  Boyle is linked to the case.  
Accordingly Boyle also has similar means, motive, and opportunity that D'Arcy and Didier had.  
It is therefore reasonable to suspect that Boyle was potentially involved in the conspiracy. 
Conclusion 
 Thomas Sheppard conspired with George Stark and Captain Joseph Smith to enslave 
Africans and bring them to the New World.  The international slave trade was a evil and barbaric 
institution, and it was explicitly prohibited by federal legislation.  Despite this fact, in 1819 the 
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practice was quite common, because the international slave trade was incredibly lucrative.  Not 
only was the international slave trade incredibly lucrative, but the Panic of 1819 created an 
incentive for merchants, who were desperate for cash, to violate the law.   
 It was under these conditions that Sheppard, Stark, and Smith attempted to use the 
Plattsburgh to capture slaves.  The fact that Sheppard, Stark, and Smith attempted to cover their 
tracks while they were doing it, indicates that they knew what they were doing was wrong.  
Furthermore, the links to several other prominent figures, including  John N. D'Arcy, Henry 
Didier, and Thomas Boyle, indicates that they may not have been acting alone.  This case gives 
deeper and more realistic insight into a time period that is often sugared over with romanticism 
forcing us, once again, to reconcile the fairy tale past we would like to sing about against the true 
history that often involves, unfortunately, destruction and devastation. 
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APPENDIX 
Thomas Sheppard (~1776-????) 
Merchant 
Mechanics Bank Director (~1807-????) 
Athenian Society (1810-1815) 
 
No Picture Available 
 
Biographic Profile of Thomas Sheppard 
Thomas Sheppard was was born on or about 1776 and resided in Baltimore Maryland.1   
He eventually became a highly successful flour merchant.2  Flour was an important commodity 
to the fledgling economy of Baltimore, because unlike flour from other ports Baltimore flour 
wouldn’t spoil in the warm climates of Brazil.3   
His success in the industry earned him enough esteem that by 1807 he was nominated to 
be a director of the Mechanic's Bank.  The individual who nominated Sheppard for the position 
noted that Sheppard was “a gentleman in very independent circumstances, acquired by his own 
indefatigable industry.”  However, this may have simply been an attempt to deflect from the fact 
that directors of the Mechanic's Bank were required to be artisans, and that Sheppard did not 
meet this criterion.4  Additionally, by 1810, Thomas Sheppard was listed as stockholder for the 
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Athenian Society, but, by 1815, he had been dropped from the roles.5  He was also a stockholder 
in the Baltimore to Havre de Grace turnpike in 1813.6 
Thomas Sheppard was intimately involved in Baltimore shipping community and 
partnered with famous shipping houses such as the D'Arcy & Diddier.7  Probably the most 
famous ship that Sheppard ever bought was the Chassuer, dubbed by the press “The Pride of 
Baltimore.”  Sheppard eventually sold the ship to Spanish Navy.8  By 1819, possibly feeling 
financial pressure from the Panic of 1819, Sheppard invested in a slave trade expedition.  The 
Plattsburgh, the ship used for the expedition, was interdicted off the coast of Africa and 
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